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In May 2015, the Law Gazette published an article on the Montgomery decision which 
looked at the law on consent with a focus on patient autonomy. In this article, we 
consider another ramification of the decision. 
The duty of disclosure a doctor owes his patient has been a sticking point in English 
law. The House of Lords had decided in Sidaway that the Bolam test – a doctor is not 
negligent if his practice accords with that of a respectable body of experts in the field – 
applied as well to the doctor’s duty to advise the patient. In the recent Montgomery 
decision, the UKSC revisited this important issue and radically changed the law. 
A Doctor’s Duty of Disclosure: 
UKSC Sets New Paradigm in 
Montgomery v Lanarkshire 
Health Board 
Introduction 
Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board (“Montgomery”)1 is about a baby being born with severe disabilities. 
Expectant mothers of small build and suffering from diabetes,2 such as the plaintiff, run the risk of shoulder dystocia, 
that is – the situation of the baby’s shoulders being unable to pass through the pelvis in a normal delivery.3 In this 
case, the patient was not told of the risk of shoulder dystocia as, in the doctor’s opinion, the possibility was very 
small. The doctor was not inclined to warn as most mothers, if told would opt for a ceasarean section and that would 
deprive them of the (desirable) opportunity of a natural delivery. 
During delivery, shoulder dystocia occurred and after desperate manouvres, the baby was delivered. Unfortunately, 
because of occlusion (blockage) of the umbilical cord, the baby was deprived of oxygen and this resulted in cerebral 
palsy. 
In the Court of Session, one4 ground of claim was that the doctor failed to advise on the risk of shoulder dystocia and 
its attendant consequences, and on the alternative of caesarean delivery. On this ground, the Court accepted the 
medical evidence given on behalf of the Health Board that the omission was proper and, following the majority 
approach in Sidaway v Bethlehem Royal Hospital (“Sidaway”),5 held that the defendant had not been negligent. The 
Judge also held that the plaintiff would not have elected for caesarean even if she had been advised; in other words, 
there was no causation. The decision was upheld by the Inner House on appeal. 
The plaintiff further appealed to the Supreme Court and invited the Court to depart from Sidaway and also reverse the 
finding as regards causation. The Court of seven Judges obliged the plaintiff and unanimously allowed the appeal. 
The judgment was issued jointly by Lord Kerr and Lord Reed, while Lady Hale delivered a short concurring 
judgment.6 
This case comment deals with the issue of duty of disclosure. Before that, a few words on causation. The Supreme 
Court was mindful that appellate Courts should exercise restraint in reversing findings of fact made at first instance. 
Nevertheless, the Court was certain that there had been a failure to consider relevant evidence. In the light of the 
evidence (in particular, the doctor’s own admission that had she raised the risk of shoulder dystocia with the plaintiff, 
the latter would “no doubt” have elected to undergo a caesarean section), the Court was of the view that causation 
was established.7 
On the main issue of duty of disclosure, the structure of the judgment was as follows: 
1. The existing legal landscape; 
2. Social and other developments and the need for a change in the law; 
3. The new legal framework of disclosure; and 
4. Arguments against changing the law. 
Existing Law on Duty of Disclosure 
As readers well-versed in this area are aware, under English law, in ascertaining whether a defendant doctor had 
lived up to the standard of care expected of him (or her), English Courts apply the Bolam8 test. According to this test, 
a doctor is not negligent if he can show that his practice accorded with a substantial and respectable body of opinion 
in his field; he will not be considered negligent “merely because there is a body of opinion who take a contrary view”.9 
In Sidaway v Bethlehem Royal Hospital,10 where a patient became paralysed after a back operation, the House of 
Lords held that the Bolam test applied not only to a doctor’s diagnosis and treatment of his patient but also his duty to 
advise or warn the patient. Hence, the doctor’s omission to disclose the risks of the particular treatment (here, a 1-2 
per cent risk of some degree of paralysis) was not negligent since the practice (of not disclosing, in such 
circumstances) was accepted as proper by a responsible body of neurosurgeons. Lords Kerr and Reed noted that the 
lower Courts in Montgomery had applied Sidaway. 
However, they also noted that according to Lord Bridge in Sidaway, the Bolam protection would not avail if there was 
a “substantial risk of grave adverse consequences” such that disclosure of the particular risk was “so obviously 
necessary to an informed choice on the part of the patient that no reasonably prudent medical man would fail to make 
it”11 (hereafter referred to as the Bridge qualification).12 
Their lordships then referred to the qualification made by the House of Lords in Bolitho v City & Hackney Health 
Authority13 that the application of the Bolam test is subject to an additional requirement (hereafter, the Bolitho 
addendum) – the Court had to be satisfied that the accepted practice had a logical basis, in that the experts had 
directed their minds to the comparative risks and benefits and had reached a defensible conclusion on the matter. 
The Judges noted14 that there was a “superficial” resemblance between the Bridge qualification and the Bolitho 
addendum. 
They also noted Lord Scarman’s dissenting view in Sidaway that a doctor is under a duty to inform the patient of the 
material risks inherent in the treatment and that a risk is material if a reasonably prudent patient would think it is 
significant.15 
Their lordships also expressed dissatisfaction with a legal framework which places the onus on the patient to ask the 
doctor questions relating to risk; they noted that patients who do not know what and how to ask are those who are in 
“the greatest need of information”.16 
They then observed that in some subsequent lower Court cases, most notably Pearce v United Bristol Healthcare 
NHS Trust (“Pearce”)17 and Wyatt v Curtis,18 Judges chose not to follow Sidaway. In Pearce, Lord Woolf MR, in a 
judgment which Roch and Mummery LLJ agreed with, boldly declared:19 
[I]f there is a significant risk which would affect the judgment of a reasonable patient, then… it is the 
responsibility of the doctor to inform the patient of the significant risk … .  
Their lordships then referred to the approach taken by the Supreme Court of Canada in Reibl v Hughes (“Reibl”)20 
and the High Court of Australia in Rogers v Whittaker (“Rogers”)21 that a doctor owes a duty to inform the patient of 
material risks. In Rogers, the Court held that a risk was material if either a reasonable person in the patient’s position 
would be likely to attach significance or if the doctor is or should reasonably be aware that the particular patient would 
be likely to attach significance.22 
Social and Other Developments 
Lords Kerr and Reed observed that the paradigm of the doctor-patient relationship had changed over time and that 
what was said in Sidaway no longer reflects the current reality in the provision of healthcare services. Patients 
nowadays are regarded as “persons holding rights” and “consumers exercising choices”.23 A related development is 
that, unlike in the past, patients in this age have better information on and understanding of medical matters.24 
Their lordships noted that these developments are in fact reflected in statements of professional practice. Good 
Medical Practice (2013) issued by the (UK) General Medical Council embodies the philosophy of the doctor working 
in partnership with patients, giving them information and respecting their rights to reach decisions. Another document 
– Consent: patients and doctors making decisions together (2008) is even more specific: 
The doctor explains the options to the patient, setting out potential benefits, risks, burdens and side effects of 
each option, including the option to have no treatment. The doctor may recommend a particular option … but 
they [sic] must not put pressure on the patient to accept their advice. The patient weighs up the potential 
benefits, risks and burdens … The patient decides. 
Further, there had been legal developments on the human rights front and Judges have become increasingly 
conscious of the need for the common law to reflect fundamental values (such as the right of self-determination) as 
mandated by the European Convention on Human Rights and other conventions.25 
These developments cumulatively indicate a move from a doctor-patient relationship model based on “medical 
paternalism” to one where the patient is able to understand the implications of the treatment, to make the decision 
and to take responsibility for it.26 In this model, the doctor has a duty to inform and the patient has right to decide,27 
and the determination of the nature and extent of this right rests not with the medical profession but with the Courts.28 
Their lordships also made the incisive comment that the application of the Bolam test to the question of disclosure is 
liable to result in the sanctioning of differences in practice which are attributable “not to the divergent schools of 
thought in medical science, but merely to divergent attitudes among doctors as to the degree of respect owed to their 
patients”.29 
In view of all the above, the Supreme Court decided that it was time to officially30 depart from the Sidaway position. 
The New Position on Duty of Disclosure 
After expressing approval of the propositions of Lord Scarman in Sidaway, Lord Woolf MR in Pearce and the High 
Court of Australia in Rogers, Lords Kerr and Reed began their formulation of the law with the preamble that a patient 
is entitled to decide on the form of treatment to undergo and his consent must be obtained before his bodily integrity 
can be interfered with.31 Hence: 
The doctor is … under a duty to take reasonable care to ensure that the patient is aware of any material risks 
involved in any recommended treatment, and of any reasonable alternative or variant treatments. The test of 
materiality is whether… a reasonable person in the patient’s position would be likely to attach significance to 
the risk, or the doctor is or should reasonably be aware that the particular patient would be likely to attach 
significance to it. 
The paradigm has changed radically. The Sidaway position was that the doctor has the right to decide whether or not 
to make disclosure, except where disclosure is so obviously necessary to informed choice. The new position is that 
the patient has the right to decide, and the doctor must disclose all material risks of the proposed treatment as well as 
of alternative treatments.32 Materiality is both objective (what a reasonable patient would regard as significant) as well 
as subjective (what the particular patient would likely regard as significant). 
Elaborating on the doctor’s duty, their lordships pointed out that the assessment of materiality, which “cannot be 
reduced to percentages”,33 takes into account a variety of factors, such as: 
1. magnitude of risk;34 
2. nature of risk;35 
3. effect upon the life of the patient; 
4. importance to the patient of the benefits sought to be achieved by the treatment; 
5. alternative treatments36 and their risks; and 
6. characteristics of the patient. 
Elaborating further,37 their lordships emphasised that the aim of the doctor’s advisory role is to ensure that the patient 
has sufficient understanding so as to be in a position to make an informed decision. The information provided must 
therefore be comprehensible. Bombarding the patient with technical information or routinely requiring signature on a 
consent form would not fulfill the duty. 
The doctor’s duty of disclosure is, however, subject to two exceptions. The first38 of these, the “therapeutic 
exception”, is where the doctor reasonably considers that its disclosure would be “seriously detrimental to the 
patient’s health”.39 Their lordships cautioned that this is a limited exception and should not be abused; “it is not 
intended to subvert [the general] principle by enabling the doctor to prevent the patient from making an informed 
choice where she is liable to make a choice which the doctor considers to be contrary to her best interests”.40 
Counter-arguments 
In deciding to change the law, their lordships were mindful of various counter-arguments but found none of them 
unassailable. On the first point – that some patients would rather trust their doctors – the rebuttal was that, in the new 
scheme, the patient can choose not to be informed of the risks, in which case the doctor is not obliged to discuss 
them. On the point of practicability (impossible to discuss risks within the time available), the retort was that 
adjustments simply have to be made. On the argument that the change in law would lead to an increase in litigation, 
their lordships thought the new model of informed choice may be less likely to lead to litigation. Finally, on the 
argument of increased unpredictability of the outcome of such litigation, the lordships felt such unpredictability was 
tolerable in view of the attendant benefit of protecting patients. Above all, the “fundamental response” to all these 
objections is that “respect for the dignity of patients requires no less”.41 
Comment 
The UKSC decision in Montgomery has brought about a momentous shift in the law. The Bolam test no longer gives 
doctors protection in respect of non-disclosure or inadequate disclosure. Montgomery lays down the following 
principles: 
1. The patient has the right to receive material information regarding his proposed treatment in order that he can 
make an informed decision; 
2. The doctor must respect the patient’s right and has a duty of disclosure – he must take reasonable care to ensure 
that the patient receives such material information; 
3. This information includes materials risks and benefits of the proposed treatment and of alternative treatments;42 
4. The nature and extent of the patient’s right (and the doctor’s duty) are determined by the Courts and not by the 
medical profession;43 
5. Materiality is both objective and subjective; 
6. Materiality takes into account magnitude and nature of risk, effect on the life of the patient, benefits sought to be 
achieved by the patient, characteristics of the paient and other factors; 
7. Materiality cannot be reduced to percentages; 
8. To facilitate understanding and informed decision, the doctor should ensure that the information provided is 
comprehensible; 
9. The duty is not fulfilled by simply getting the client to sign a consent form; 
10. (implicitly) The doctor must have reasonable grounds to believe that the patient understands the information that 
is given to him; and 
11. The duty of disclosure is subject to the therapeutic exception44 but the exception is a limited one and should not 
be abused. 
As mentioned earlier, the default position has changed. Under Sidaway, the doctor need not disclose (so long as he 
satisfied Bolam) unless disclosure was “so obviously necessary”. Under Montgomery, there is a duty to disclose 
unless disclosure is “so seriously detrimental” (to the patient’s health).45 
Note also the change to the threshold which triggers the duty to disclose. As observed by Lords Kerr and Reed,46 
while the Bridge qualification refers to “substantial” risk, Lord Woolf MR in Pearce used the term “significant’ risk; the 
latter expression, they thought, was more apt. In the new Montgomery framework, a material risk is one which is 
“significant” – a lower threshold than “substantial”. 
With the change in law, the English Courts now recognise that there is indeed a difference between diagnosis and 
treatment on the one hand and provision of advice or information on the other. To paraphrase Mason CJ’s 
explanation47 in Rogers, the dynamics of participation is that the patient gives information to the doctor to assist the 
doctor to diagnose and treat, while the doctor gives information to the patient to enable the patient to make a decision 
as to the treatment. 
The UK Supreme Court has now aligned the law to the expectations of UK’s General Medical Council. No doubt, 
medical practitioners in the UK henceforth have to take their duty of disclosure even more seriously and perform 
greater due diligence. 
Singapore Position 
In Singapore, the legal position is the one adopted by the Court of Appeal in Khoo James v Gunapathy d/o 
Muniandy,48 where Yong Pung How CJ, after surveying the jurisprudence on the subject, firmly declared49 that the 
Bolam test and the Bolitho threshold of logic apply to the whole of a doctor’s duty to diagnose, advise and treat. He 
also remarked that the Bolitho addendum was timely as it “gave voice to a commonsense understanding … that the 
Bolam test did not represent immunity from judicial inquiry over the medical process”. Yong CJ commented that the 
Bridge qualification was a “forerunner” of the Bolitho caveat.  
The Gunapathy stand was applied in subsequent cases, most notably D’Conceicao Jeanie Doris v Tong Ming 
Chuan50 and Tong Seok May Joanne v Yau Hok Man Gordon.51 In D’Conceicao, Justice Tay Yong Kwang discussed 
the subject at length and remarked that Gunapathy was binding on him – the Bolam test together with the Bolitho 
addendum applied. In respect of the latter, his honour remarked:52 
I do agree … that if the medical profession illogically omits to warn of risks which patients should undoubtedly 
be informed of, then the court should interfere on the authority of Bolitho. 
In the next breadth, he said that “in this regard”, he would turn to the Bridge qualification and appears to equate it with 
the Bolitho addendum.53 
It appears, then, that the current state of Singapore law as to a doctor’s duty of disclosure is that the Bolam test, as 
qualified by Bolitho, applies. A doctor will not be negligent if his conduct (as regards advice to the patient) accords 
with that of a respectable body of experts and passes the threshold of logic. Also, the Bolitho addendum is similar, if 
not equivalent, to the Bridge qualification. 
The question is whether it is time for Singapore Courts to follow the lead of the Canadian, Australian, Malaysian54 
and, now, English Courts and recognise the doctrine of informed consent55 (also known as the Canterbury 
doctrine56). An important consideration is whether the paradigm of the doctor-patient relationship has evolved and 
changed sufficiently. As far as the expectation of the medical profession is concerned, the Singapore Medical 
Council’s Ethical Code and Ethical Guidelines provide as follows: 
4.2.2 Informed consent 
It is a doctor’s responsibility to ensure that a patient … is adequately informed about his medical condition and 
options for treatment so that he is able to participate in decisions about his treatment. If a procedure needs to 
be performed, that patient shall be made aware of the benefit, risks and possible complications of the 
procedure and any alternatives available to him. 
4.2.4 Patient’s right to information and self-determination 
A doctor shall provide adequate information to a patient so that he can make informed choices about his 
further medical management. A doctor shall provide information to the best of this ability, communicate clearly 
and in a language that is understood by the patient. 
These expectations have also been recognised in recent newsletters of the Singapore Medical Association, as one 
writer points out.57 
Clearly, the local guidelines are similar to those in England and encapsulate the concepts of the patient’s rights to 
information and to make informed decision and the doctor’s corresponding duty to provide material information. 
As for the knowledge of, and ability to comprehend medical matters, anecdotal evidence suggests that the level is 
reasonably high in the modern city state of Singapore. In such a society, the importance and respect given to human 
rights in general and the right of self-determination in medical matters58 in particular is likewise heightened. The 
absence in Singapore of specific human rights statutes59 is not critical, for the Courts in Rogers and in Reibl did not 
refer to or garner support from any such statute to arrive at their legal position. 
More fundamentally, the simple reason Singapore Courts should move to the Montgomery position is that it is fair and 
just that the patient, whose body and/or life are most affected by the treatment, should be informed of the risks and 
should have the primary say as to whether the procedure should be proceeded with. 
Concluding Remarks 
The nature of case law is that desired or desirable changes can take a long time to come to pass. Three decades 
after the House of Lords decision in Sidaway, the UK Supreme Court has finally decided that, on the issue of 
disclosure, the right of the patient is more important than the protection of the medical profession. Meanwhile, doctors 
and lawyers in Singapore wait anxiously to see if Singapore Courts would follow in the steps of Montgomery.  
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